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Abstract
In Mitsui & Co. v. American Export Lines, Inc., the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
rejected the “functional economics” test which it had developed in an earlier case as a standard for
interpreting section 4(5) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA). Part One of this Recent
Development will discuss the historical development of the problem of carrier liability. Part Two
will examine the case law as it has evolved in the Second Circuit since the late 1960’s. Part Three
will then analyze the Mitsui decision and the impact it has had on the law in this area.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ADMIRALTY-THE PACKAGE DOCTRINE OF COGSA § 4(5)-SECOND

CIRCUIT ABANDONS

THE

"FUNCTIONAL

ECONOMICS"

TEST

-Mitsui & Co. v. American Export Lines, Inc., Nos. 80-7095/7085
(2d Cir. Jan. 16, 1981).
In Mitsui & Co. v. American Export Lines, Inc. I the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit 2 rejected the "functional economics" test which it had developed in an earlier case 3 as a standard
for interpreting section 4(5) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
(COGSA).4 That section provides in pertinent part:
Neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any event be or become
liable for any loss or damage to or in connection with the transportation of goods in an amount exceeding $500 per package lawfid money of the United States, or in case of goods not shipped
in packages, per customary freight unit . . . unless the nature
and value of such goods have been declared by the shipper be5
fore shipment and inserted in the bill of lading.

Since the passage of the act in 1936,6 there has been heated
debate as to the precise definition of a "package" for purposes of
this section. 7 This debate reached a new intensity with the advent
of containerization in the 1960's.8 With carriers now providing
1. Nos. 80-7095/7085, slip op. at 1093 (2d Cir. Jan. 16, 1981).
2. The case was heard before Chief Judge Feinberg, Circuit Judge Oakes, and
Circuit Judge Friendly, who delivered the opinion of the court. Id. at 1066-67.
3. Royal Typewriter Co. v. MN Kulmerland, 483 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1973). The
functional economics test was so named because of the emphasis it placed on the
functional character of export packaging in determining carrier liability. See notes
52-56 infra and accompanying text.
4. 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) (1976).
5. Id.
6. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, Pub. L. No. 521, ch. 229, 49 Stat. 1207 (1936).
7. For examples of early cases on this point, see Gulf Italia Co. v. American Export Lines, Inc., 263 F.2d 135 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 902 (1959) (partially
wrapped but not fully enclosed tractor is not a package); Mitsubishi Int'l Corp. v.
S.S. Palmetto State, 311 F.2d 382 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 922 (1963)
(three fully enclosed rolls of steel are a package).
8. Containerization became popular in the 1960's as an economic means of
shipping cargo. It allows shippers to load their goods directly at their plants into
reusable metal containers. The most common size of these containers is 40 feet by 8
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large reusable containers which the shippers could load themselves
at inland points, the courts had to determine whether the container or some unit within the container as loaded was the "package" for determining liability. 9 As might have been expected, the
definitions arrived at were numerous and varied. 10 The functional
economics test developed by the Second Circuit became the touchstone of discussion on the issue, both in those courts which ac-

cepted it and in those which refused to follow it. The criticism engendered by the test" and its inconsistency with prior law 12 have
finally brought the Second Circuit to reconsider the problems
raised by containerization. Recognizing the inadequacy of the functional economics test, the court has now adopted a far more pragmatic approach.
Part One of this Recent Development will discuss the historical development of the problem of carrier liability. Part Two will
examine the case law as it has evolved in the Second Circuit since
feet by 8 feet. The goods are then transported in the container to the ship, where
they can be stowed more efficiently for passage. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW
OF ADMIRALTY 14 (2d ed. 1975); Bissell, The Operational Realities of
Containerizationand Their Effect on the "Package" Limitation and the "On-Deck"
Prohibition: Review and Suggestions, 45 TUL. L. REV. 902 (1971); Calamari, The
Container Revolution and the $500 Package Limitation-Conflicting Approaches
and Unrealistic Solutions: A Proposed Alternative, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 687, 688
n.4 (1977).
9. COGSA does provide that the liability of the carrier may exceed $500 per
package when the shipper declares a higher value for the goods. See note 5 supra
and accompanying text. The shipper might then have to pay a higher freight charge
to compensate for the increased cost of liability insurance of the carrier. Although
the carrier may argue that a shipper who fails to declare a higher value in the bill of
lading should be estopped from making this claim after the loss has occurred, this argument merely begs the question of how the shipper could have assessed the potential liability of the carrier prior to shipment. The shipper must first be able to determine what will be considered a package under the act before he is able to decide
whether it is necessary to declare a higher value for the cargo. See Standard
Electrica, S.A. v. Hamburg Sudamerikanische Dampfschiffahrts-Gesellschaft, 375
F.2d 943, 948 (2d Cir. 1967) (Feinberg, J., dissenting).
10. See Bissell, supra note 8, at 905-06; De Orchis, The Container and the

Package Limitation-The Search for Predictability, 5 J. MAR. L. & COM. 251 (1974);
Simon, The Law of Shipping Containers, 5 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 507, 515-17 (1974);
van Wageningen, Interpreting COGSA: The Meaning of "Package", 30 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 169 (1975).
11. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 10, at 520-30; Simon, More on the Law of Shipping Containers, 6 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 603, 611-18 (1975); Note, Containers and the
Problem of Interpretation Under COGSA Section 4(5), 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 301,
307-08 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Problem of Interpretation].
12. See text accompanying notes 100-05 infra.
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the late 1960's. Part Three will then analyze the Mitsui decision
and the impact it has had on the law in this area.
I.

THE PROBLEMS AT COMMON LAW AND
THE STATUTORY SOLUTIONS
At common law, the extent to which a carrier could be held liable for loss or damage to cargo steadily decreased as the shipping
industry grew. Under general maritime law, carrier liability was almost absolute.13 During the nineteenth century, the burden of loss
shifted to the point where carriers could contract away almost all
their liability in the bill of lading. 14 This change was possible because of the serious inequality in bargaining position between the
carrier and the shipper. 15
COGSA was not the first statutory solution to the problem of
carrier liability. In 1893, Congress attempted to strike a compromise between the interests of the shippers and carriers in the
Harter Act. 16 Sections 1 and 2 of the act favor the shipper by forbidding certain stipulations from being asserted into the bill of lading, such as exemptions from liability for carrier negligence, 1 7 failure to use due care with respect to the cargo,' 8 or failure to use
due diligence in furnishing a seaworthy vessel.19 Section 3 acts as a
balance to these prohibitions by limiting carrier liability for errors
of navigation, dangers of the sea, and acts of God.2 0 In 1921, this
compromise became incorporated into the Hague Rules, 2 1 the
13. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 8, at 139-40. Even when liability was
virtually absolute, there were exceptions which absolved the carrier of responsibility
if the loss was caused by an act of God or public enemy, the inherent vice of the
goods, or the fault of the shipper.
14. Id. at 142. With the introduction of the bill of lading (the contract between
the carrier and the shipper), carriers began inserting many more exemptions from liability into the contract. The list of exceptions became long and fairly standardized.
Id. at 140. See Legislative Note, 23 VA. L. REv. 590, 595 (1937).

15.

See Recupero, The Shipper's Right to Recover Under COGSA for Damage

to ContainerizedCargo, 15 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 51, 52 (1973).
16. 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-196 (1976).

17. Id. § 190.
18.
19.

Id.
Id.

§

191.

20. Id. § 192.
21. 51 Stat. 233 (1924). The Hague Rules were promulgated to provide some
uniformity in the law governing international carriage of goods by sea. They provide
in part:
Neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any event be or become liable for
any loss or damage to or in connection with goods in an amount exceeding
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leading international agreement in this area. The Hague Rules in
22
turn became the basis for COGSA.
COGSA was enacted to give primacy in domestic law to the
United States' adherence to the Hague Rules. 23 Although the legis-

100 pounds sterling per package or unit or the equivalent of that sum in
other currency unless the nature and value of such goods have been declared by the shipper before shipment and inserted in the bill of lading.
Id. at 252. These Rules were first drafted as clauses which could be voluntarily inserted into bills of lading. In 1924, they took the form of a convention, to which the
United States adhered subject to a number of reservations. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK,
supra note 8, at 143-44. The convention was ratified by 12 nations and adhered to by
30 others, making it one of the most widely ratified private law conventions.
The Hague Rules were revised by the 1968 Protocol adopted in Brussels, also
known as the Visby Amendments. Protocol to Amend the International Convention
for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading, Feb. 23,
1968, 1 TRANSPORT LAWS OF THE WORLD, I/E/15 (1977). The section which deals
with the package limitation now provides: "Where a container, pallet or similar article of transport is used to consolidate goods, the number of packages or units enumerated in the Bill of Lading as packed in such article of Transport shall be deemed
the number of packages or units for the purpose of this paragraph." Id. at 4. The Protocol came into force in 1977. There are now 15 nations party to it. The United
States has not ratified the Protocol, and Professors Gilmore and Black note that since
ratification has been slow, one should proceed for now on the assumption that
COGSA will continue to be the law. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 8, at 144.
For an extensive discussion of the container clause as it appears in the Protocol, see
DeGurse, The "Container Clause" in Article 4(5) of the 1968 Protocol to the Hague
Rules, 2 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 131 (1970).
The most recent international formulation on the issue is found in the 1978 Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, commonly known as the Hamburg Rules.
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 89/13 (1978). The United States is signatory to the Hamburg
Rules along with 25 other nations, but has not ratified the Rules. For a discussion of
the changes and solutions provided by the Rules, see THE HAMBURG RULES ON THE
CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA (S. Mankabady ed. 1978).

22. The language of the Hague Rules and COGSA are very similar. Compare
note 21 supra with text accompanying note 5 supra. There is, however, one important difference between the two:
[T]he Hague Rules limit carrier liability to $500 per package or unit, in contrast to COGSA's per package or customary freight unit limitation. Under the
Hague Rules, it apparently makes little difference whether an item is considered a package or an unpackaged unit since the terms have been construed to have essentially the same meaning. Conversely, under COGSA
there is a significant difference between a package and a customary freight
unit.
Calamari, supra note 8, at 691 (footnotes omitted).
23. See 79 CONG. REC. 13,340-41 (1935) (remarks of Sen. White). An Understanding to the ratification of the Hague Rules provides that where COGSA and the
Hague Rules conflict, COGSA will prevail. Second Understanding to the United
States' Ramification of the Hague Rules, May 6, 1937, reprinted in A. KNAUTH, THE
AMERICAN LAW OF OCEAN BILLS OF LADING 77 (4th ed. 1953).
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lative history is unclear, 24 it would appear that sponsors of COGSA
were again trying to effect some kind of compromise between the
interests of the carrier and shipper. This is evidenced by the setting of the $500 package limitation. As a minimum liability which
cannot be contracted away, 25 it ensures that shippers will be at
least partially compensated for the loss of their cargo. The same
$500 amount also acts as a ceiling which limits the carrier's poten26
tial liability.
Today, COGSA governs the export and import of goods in foreign trade,2 7 but the Harter Act remains in effect with respect to
domestic shipping, 28 with the stipulation that a bill of lading for
domestic transport may by its terms bring itself within the provisions of COGSA.2 9 The most important difference between the two
is the absence of a provision in the Harter Act regarding a package
limitation on liability. 30 In addition, COGSA allows for greater
freedom of contract to the extent that carrier liability may be increased, but not decreased, by agreement of the parties.3 1
II.

THE FUNCTIONAL ECONOMICS TEST OF
THE SECOND CIRCUIT
A.

The Evolution of the Test
As previously noted, the functional economics test was only
one solution of many which emerged from the courts in response
to the container revolution.3 2 In fact, it was not the first interpretation to be proffered by the Second Circuit. Prior to Mitsui, the
court had already decided a line of cases which were reconcilable
only on very tenuous grounds.
24. Differing interpretations have been offered as to the congressional intent
behind COGSA. See, e.g., Mitsui & Co. v. American Export Lines, Inc., Nos.
80-7095/7085, slip op. at 1077-78; Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d
800, 815 (2d Cir. 1971); Problem of Interpretation,supra note 11, at 303-04 & n.16.

25. 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) (1976).
26. See id.
27. 46 U.S.C. § 1300 (1976). The status of COGSA is subject to whatever revisions may be ratified by the United States in the future under the 1968 Protocol and
the Hamburg Rules. See note 21 supra.
28. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 8, at 147.
29. 46 U.S.C. § 1312 (1976); see Edelman, Cargo Claims, Limitation of Liability on a Container, N.Y.L.J., June 5, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
30. 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-196 (1976). See also Calamari, supra note 8, at 690.
31. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 8, at 145.
32. See notes 67-74 infra and accompanying text.
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The first of these cases was Standard Electrica, S.A. v. Hamburg Sudamerikanische Dampfschifffahrts-Gesellschaft.33 Although
the case involved palletized 34 rather than containerized cargo, it is
still instructive in terms of the criteria used by the court in
determining the meaning of "package" in light of technological
changes in the shipping industry. Holding the pallets, rather than
the individual cartons which they supported, to be the COGSA
package, 3 5 the court seemed particularly concerned with the intent
of the parties as evidenced in the shipping documents 36 and the
fact that the shipper had himself chosen to utilize the pallets. 37 In
a strong dissent, Judge Feinberg criticized the majority opinion as
having disregarded the intent of Congress in enacting section 4(5),
which he felt should be construed in close cases such as this so as
to protect the cargo interest as against the carrier. 38 Subsequently,
other members of the court were willing to express their concur39
rence with the Standard Electrica majority rationale.
Within the next four years, the court's position changed dras33. 375 F.2d 943 (2d Cir. 1967).
34. Six cartons, each containing forty television tuners, were stacked on a
wooden platform or pallet in three tiers. A second wooden deck was placed on top of
the cartons, and everything was held together by metal straps. Id. at 944.
35. Id.
36. The shipping documents referred to a quantity of nine, indicating the nine
pallets on which the cartons were stacked. No further description of the contents was
given. Id. at 946.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 947 (Feinberg, J., dissenting). Judge Feinberg also addressed and disposed of the major arguments advanced by the majority. First, he said that the intent
of the parties was at best ambiguous, and not as clear-cut as the majority's reference
to the shipping documents alone suggested. Id. at 948. Second, he found the majority's point that it was in fact the shipper who chose to palletize the cargo to be irrelevant. Id. Third, he noted that the opportunity to declare a higher value simply
begged the question of how to define "package" for purposes of § 4(5). Id. See also
note 9 supra.
39. Of particular interest has been Judge Hays' dissenting opinion in Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. v. S.S. Hong Kong Producer, 422 F.2d 7, 19-20 (2d Cir. 1969)
(Hays, J., dissenting). Although the majority in that case did not consider the question of the package limitation, Judge Hays dissented to show his support for the
Standard Electrica view that the container could in fact be the COGSA package.
There was, however, a distinction between Standard Electrica and Encyclopedia
Britannica which Judge Hays did not consider. While the shipping documents in
Standard Electrica described only nine pallets with no further explanation of their
contents, the bill of lading in Encyclopedia Britannica described "one container
s.t.c. [said to contain] 536 cartons of bound books." This distinction could be crucial
under the approaches adopted in later cases. See notes 45, 103 infra and accompanying text.
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tically. In Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 40 the court
held that a provision in the bill of lading limiting the carrier's liability to $500 with respect to the contents of each container" l was
invalid under COGSA. 42 The bill of lading described the goods as
"1 container s.t.c. [said to contain] 99 bales of leather." 43 Although
Standard Electrica was distinguished on its facts, 44 the court espoused a new rationale which threw the entire Standard Electrica
reasoning into doubt. Returning to the importance of congressional
intent, Judge Friendly stated:
Still we cannot escape the belief that the purpose of § 4(5) of
COGSA was to set a reasonable figure below which the carrier
should not be permitted to limit his liability and that "package"
is thus more sensibly related to the unit in which the shipper
packed the goods and described them than to a large metal object, functionally a part of the ship, in which the carrier caused
them to be "contained. "'45

At the very least, the Leather's Best holding would seem to
say that if goods are shipped in what would ordinarily be considered a package, within a container furnished by the carrier, and
the number of such packages is disclosed in the bill of lading, then
those packages, rather than the container, would be the COGSA
package. 4 6 Admittedly, these criteria might not have changed the
result in Standard Electrica, primarily because the contents of the
pallets in that case were not disclosed in the bill of lading. 47 This
question, however, was left open by the Leather's Best court. Of
primary importance was the new emphasis on the common, ordinary meaning of the word "package," and the sense of sympathy
for the shipper evident in the court's interpretation of COGSA and
the legislative intent behind the act.
40. 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971).
41. Id. at 804.
42. Id. at 816.
43. Id. at 804.
44. Id. at 815. Standard Electrica involved pallets instead of containers, admittedly a somewhat different proposition. Also, the pallets in Standard Electrica had
been made up by the shipper and the shipping documents seemed to indicate that
the parties regarded the pallets to be the packages. Id.
45. Id. at 815 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court, in a
longshoreman's personal injury case, has characterized a container as "a modern substitute for the hold of the vessel." Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432
U.S. 249, 270 (1977).
46. 451 F.2d at 804, 815-16.
47. 375 F.2d at 946; see note 44 supra.
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The holding in Leather's Best was reinterpreted by the Second
Circuit in Royal Typewriter Co. v. MY Kulmerland4 8 so that it
would comport with the new standard being enunciated in that
case, the functional economics test. 4 9 In Kulmerland the court was
faced with the situation which Leather's Best had left open, specifically, the case in which the shipper furnished the container and
failed to disclose the contents to the carrier. 50 In an attempt to
achieve uniformity in these decisions, the test of functional
packaging was created as a " 'common sense test' under which all
parties concerned can allocate responsibility for loss at the time of
contract, purchase additional insurance if necessary, and thus
'avoid the pains of litigation.' "51
The functional economics test allocates the burden of proof between carrier and shipper for showing whether the container or the
individual units within the container are the COGSA packages. 5 2
The primary consideration is the actual packaging of the goods as it
affects their suitability for breakbulk shipment. 53 If the goods could
have been shipped in the individual cartons in which the shipper
packed them, then the presumption arises that the carton is the
package, and the burden of proof is on the carrier to show that the
parties intended otherwise. 5 ' Conversely, if the actual packaging
would not be suitable for breakbulk shipment, then the presumption is that the container is the package, and this presumption
must be rebutted by the shipper with evidence that the parties actually intended the cartons to be the COGSA package. 55 Factors
such as trade usage, custom, and characterization of the cargo in
this shipping documents are only relevant in rebutting the presumption which is created by law.56
Using this test the court found that the goods in question
could not have been shipped as they were packaged, and therefore

48. 483 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1973).
49. Id. at 648. The test was later applied and explicated in Cameco, Inc. v. S.S.
American Legion, 514 F.2d 1291 (2d Cir. 1974).
50. 483 F.2d at 646.
51. Id. at 649 (quoting Standard Electrica, 375 F.2d at 945).
52. Id. at 649; Cameco, Inc. v. S.S. American Legion, 514 F.2d at 1298.
53. 483 F.2d at 648. Breakbulk refers to the method of shipping whereby individual barrels, boxes, bales, bags, cartons, and drums are stowed in the hold of the
vessel, as opposed to being placed in containers. Calamari, supra note 8, at 692 n.24.
54. 483 F.2d at 649,
55. Id.
56. Calamari, supra note 8, at 703.
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the container was the package unless the shipper could prove that
the parties intended otherwise. 5 7 The court went on to say that the
underlying concept in Leather's Best was that the bales of leather
could have been shipped breakbulk as they were packaged, and
therefore constituted the COGSA package. 58 In fact, the court
found the entire functional economics test to be implicit in the
59
holding of Leather's Best.
B.

Criticism of the Functional Economics Test

The functional economics test has brought severe criticism
from courts 60 and commentators alike. 6 1 The Mitsui court itself
provides a comprehensive analysis of the test's weaknesses. 62 First,
there is the issue of economic waste. The functional economics test
requires the shipper to go to the unnecessary expense of packaging
his goods for overseas shipment, even though they will be stored
in a container, in order to hold the carrier liable for $500 per
unit. 63 Second, there is the issue of uncertainty. The shipper has
little basis for predicting whether his packaging will in fact pass the
Kulmerland test.6 4 Similarly, if the shipper has loaded the container at an inland point, the carrier cannot know what type of
packaging has been used and consequently cannot assess his potential liability. 65 This prevalent uncertainty makes it impossible for
both the carrier and shipper to make informed decisions regarding
66
the purchase of additional insurance.
One decision which has received a great deal of attention for
its criticism of the functional economics test is Matsushita Electric
Corp. v. S.S. Aegis Spirit,67 decided in the Western District of
Washington. Written by Judge Beeks, "an experienced admiralty
57.

483 F.2d at 649.

58. Id.
59. Id.
60. For a discussion of the cases prior to Mitsui which were critical of the functional economics test, see notes 67-74 infra and accompanying text.
61. See note 11 supra.
62. Nos. 80-7095/7085, slip op. at 1088.
63. See Simon, supra note 10, at 523.
64. See Nos. 80-7095/7085, slip op. at 1088; Problem of Interpretation,supra
note 11, at 307.
65. See Nos. 80-7095/7085, slip op. at 1088; Problem of Interpretation,supra
note 11, at 308.
66. The problem is analogous to that of the shipper predicting the necessity of
declaring a higher value in the bill of lading. See note 9 supra.
67. 414 F. Supp. 894 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
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lawyer before his appointment to the bench," 68 Matsushita is the
only law on the subject to date within the important Ninth Circuit. 69 Judge Beeks focused his attention on the intent of Congress
in enacting COGSA. 70 He noted that the only distinction made in
the statute is between those goods which are shipped in packages
and those which are not. The line between goods shipped in sturdy
packaging and those shipped in lesser packaging is one which is
simply not drawn under the act. 71 Furthermore, overemphasizing
the intent of the parties makes the intent of Congress in establishing a minimum liability "illusory and negotiable." 7 2 In other
words, if the parties are allowed to change the plain meaning of
the word "package" as it is used in the statute, then the $500 limi73
tation becomes meaningless.
Other courts have followed Matsushita, advanced their own
criticism, and proposed their own solutions. 74 As the Mitsui court
68. Nos. 80-7095/7085, slip op. at 1089.
69. The Ninth Circuit, like the Second Circuit, is important in the area of admiralty law because it has jurisdiction over large coastal areas. Although Matsushita
was a case of first impression within the Ninth Circuit, it is worth noting the remarks
made by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Pacific Far
East Lines, Inc., 491 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1974), which appear to support a Leather's
Best type of reasoning. See the discussion in Matsushita, 414 F. Supp. at 903.
70. 414 F. Supp. at 904.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 905.
73. Id. It should be noted that victims of adhesion contracts have by definition
not been able to express an intent. Simon, supra note 11, at 615.
74. See, e.g., Yeramex Int'l v. S.S. Tendo, 55 A.M.C. 1807 (E.D. Va. 1977),
rev'd, 595 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1979); Commonwealth Petrochemicals, Inc. v. S.S.
Puerto Rico, 455 F. Supp. 310 (D. Md. 1978), rev'd, 607 F.2d 322 (4th Cir. 1979). An
example of how complex the solutions can become is provided by In re Norfolk,
Baltimore and Carolina Line, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 383 (E.D. Va. 1979) where the court
expounded twelve criteria for determining what constitutes the COGSA package:
(1) Whether the carrier actually possesses superior bargaining strength sufficient to coerce the shipper's agreement to adhesion contract; (2) Whether
the parties treated the container as a single unit in their negotiations, on the
documents of contract, and in determining the shipping rate; (3) Whether
the shipper, or at least one other than the carrier, chose to ship the goods in
container; (4) Whether the shipper or carrier procured the container; (5)
Whether the goods were delivered to the carrier previously loaded into the
container; (6) Whether the goods were loaded by the shipper or by the carrier; (7) Whether the carrier actually observed the contents of the container
before it was sealed for shipment; (8) Whether the container was loaded
with the shipper's goods only, and not those of any other shipper; (9)
Whether the markings on the containers provided a complete and accurate
indication of the contents and their value; (10) Whether the bill of lading
contained any declaration of the nature of the container's contents and their
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noted, these decisions "indicate that the likelihood of general acceptance of the functional economics test is small." 75 The district
court in Matsushita, faced with the dichotomy created by the Second Circuit in the Standard Electrica/Leather's Best line of cases,
noted that "[o]ne might well conclude that the Second Circuit is
still in the process of refining an appropriate legal standard to resolve the limitation question." 7 6 The Second Circuit has grasped
another opportunity to do just that in Mitsui.
III.

MITSUI & CO. v. AMERICAN EXPORT LINES, INC.
The Mitsui decision involved two plaintiffs, both of whom suffered loss of or damage to their cargo which was being carried by
defendant American Export Lines (AEL) aboard the S.S. Red
Jacket. 77 Plaintiffs Mitsui & Co. and Ataka & Co. (Mitsui) were
consignees of 1834 tin ingots. Plaintiffs Armstrong Cork Canada,
Ltd. and Armstrong Cork Co. (Armstrong) were the shippers of
1705 rolls of floor covering. On January 10, 1974, a storm caused a
stow of 50 containers to collapse, sending 43 containers overboard
and damaging the rest. 78 American Export Lines was found to be
liable for the loss in an earlier case, 7 9 and all that remained in
Mitsui was the settlement of these two damage claims.
The tin ingots had been piled into 124 stacks and shipped in
five containers.8 0 The stacks were referred to as bundles and were
designated as such in the bills of lading. 8 ' The ingots were not
strapped together or secured into these bundles in any way. 82 AEL
claimed that the ingots were shipped in five packages, referring to
the five containers in which the ingots were stowed, which would

value; (11) Whether the bill of lading provided the shipper with an adequate
opportunity to declare the value of the container and its contents, and to obtain financial protection for any excess value; (12) Whether the shipper took
advantage of this opportunity.
Id. at 392.
75. Nos. 80-7095/7085, slip op. at 1089.
76. 414 F. Supp. at 903.
77. Nos. 80-7095/7085, slip op. at 1068-69.
78. Id.
79. Houldew & Co. v. S.S. Red Jacket, 55 A.M.C. 1382 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd
by order, 582 F.2d 1271 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom. Am. Export Lines, Inc.
v. Metal Traders, Inc., 439 U.S. 1128 (1979).
80. Nos. 80-7095/7085, slip op. at 1069.
81. Id. at 1072.
82. Id. at 1070-71.
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limit its liability to $2500.83 Mitsui, on the other hand, claimed
that the ingots were not shipped in packages at all, and that the
carrier's liability was therefore $500 per ingot under a clause in the
bill of lading which fixed liability at $500 per package or per shipping unit. 84
The floor covering rolls were wrapped by the shipper, who
had inserted fibre discs at the top and bottom to protect the rolls,
and wrapped the bottom in burlap to hold the discs in place.8 5 The
bills of lading described a specific number of rolls said to be contained within the carrier's thirteen containers. 8 6 AEL again contended that its liability was limited to $500 per container, or
$6500. Armstrong considered each roll to be a package, and asked
that liability be determined accordingly.87
Judge Motley in the district court applied the functional economics test to these facts. 88 She found that prior to containerization, ingots had been shipped in bundles, and each bundle was
therefore the COGSA package. She disregarded the fact that the
bundles were not strapped or tied, apparently because the stacking
itself was useful in the loading process. 89 Both AEL and the Mitsui
plaintiffs appealed. As to the Armstrong plaintiffs, each roll of floor
covering was found to be a package. Since the figure of $500 per
roll exceeded the actual value of the goods, the actual value was
awarded. 90 AEL appealed.
Writing for the Court of Appeals, Judge Friendly engaged in
an extensive analysis of the law as it had developed in the Second
Circuit, and considered at length the various lines of criticism
which had evolved in response to the functional economics test of
Kumberland.9 1 Judge Friendly seemed to accept the Standard
Electrica interpretation of congressional intent in COGSA when he
wrote:
Although the legislative history of COGSA does not make clear
why Congress created a ceiling on liability, the drafters of § 4(5)
83.

Id. at 1069.
Id.
85. Id. at 1073.
86. Id. at 1069, 1074.
87. Id. at 1069.
88. Armstrong Cork Can., Ltd. v. S.S. Red Jacket, 74 Civ. 2770, slip. op. at 4-5
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 1979).
89. Id. at 7, 9.
90. Nos. 80-7095/7085, slip op. at 1075.
91. Id. at 1088-93.
84.
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must have contemplated that a fixed limit on liability . . .would

permit the parties to 'ascertain at the time of contract when additional coverage was needed, place the risk of additional loss
92
upon one or the other, and thus avoid the pains of litigation.'
In addition, Judge Friendly acknowledged that Congress probably
had the superior bargaining position of the carrier in mind when it
prohibited the reduction of liability below the $500 limit. 9 3 In a
later footnote, he pointed out that the result in Kulmerland was directly opposed to this two-fold rationale. 94 The total value of the
adding machines in that case was $29,000, yet recovery was limited
to $500 under the functional economics test, and would have remained so even if the bill of lading had disclosed the number of
cartons and described the goods. 95 "This limitation would be reminiscent of the precise evil which . . . COGSA [was] designed to
96

remedy."
Although the criticism of Kulmerland was extensive and the
congressional purpose had not been served by the functional economics test, the court did not base its decision in Mitsui on these
considerations alone. 9 7 In fact, Judge Friendly was particularly
careful to point out that the court would be bound by Kulmerland,
in spite of all its difficulties, unless it proved to be inconsistent
with previous case law. 98 Finding that Kulmerland was in fact inconsistent with the holding in Leather's Best, the court overruled
Kulmerland and thereby abandoned the functional economics
test. 99

The Kulmerland court had claimed that the critical consideration under the functional economics test, i.e., whether or not the
goods were packaged for breakbulk shipment, was implicit in the
Leather's Best holding.' 0 0 Judge Friendly pointed out, however, that
the question of whether or not the bales of leather could have been
shipped breakbulk was never considered in Leather's Best. No evidence was introduced on the point, and the argument was never
92. Id. at 1077-78 (quoting Standard Electrica, 375 F.2d at 945). See also note
51 supra and accompanying text.
93. Nos. 80-7095/7085, slip op. at 1078.
94. Id. at 1085 n.ll.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See id. at 1085.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1086. See generally Simon, supra note 10, at 527-29.
100. See 483 F.2d at 649.
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advanced.10 1 Not only was there no basis in fact for this primary
assertion in Kulmerland, but the results in the two cases were
found to be inconsistent as well.1 02 Under Leather's Best, if the
container is furnished by the carrier and the contents are disclosed,
then the container is not the COGSA package. 10 3 Application of
the functional economics test changes this result if the contents are
not suitably packaged for export shipment.10 4 The inconsistency is
clear. In Mitsui the contents of a carrier furnished container were
disclosed. The court found, therefore, that they "must apply the
square holding of Leather's Best . . . and not the inconsistent test
105
announced in Kulmerland.'
Where does this leave Kulmerland? The Mitsui court accepted
the first part of the functional economics test, wherein packages
suitable for breakbulk shipment are considered the COGSA packages.10 6 The second part of the test, however, which presumes the
container to be the package if the units within are not suitable for
export shipment, did not stand. 10 7 The Mitsui court acknowledged
that such a test may in fact show that the units are not packages,
but it does not necessarily follow that the container is the package
simply because the units are not.108 What of the more likely conclusion, proposed by Judge Friendly, that the goods were not
shipped in packages at all, in which case liability would be assessed at $500 per customary freight unit (as opposed to per package) under the specific provision of 4(5)?109
With this far more pragmatic rationale in mind, the court proceeded upon the facts before it. With respect to the Armstrong
plaintiffs, the court found each roll of floor covering to be a package within the plain, ordinary meaning of the word, noting that
each had been wrapped sufficiently so as to conform to such meaning.11 0 The issue of whether or not that wrapping was suitable for
breakbulk shipment, which would have been decisive under the
functional economics test, was found to be immaterial.1 11
101.

Nos. 80-7095/7085, slip op. at 1086.

102. Id.
103.
104.

Id.; see text accompanying notes 40-46 supra.
Nos. 80-7095/7085, slip op. at 1086.

105.

Id.

106.

Id. at 1086-87.

107. Id. at 1087.

108. Id.
109.
110.

Id.; see text accompanying note 5 supra.
Nos. 80-7095/7085, slip op. at 1094,

111.

Id.
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The aflirmance in the case of the Mitsui plaintiffs was somewhat more involved. The court disagreed with Judge Motley's conclusion that each bundle was a package. 1 12 Whereas Judge Motley
had considered the way in which ingots had been shipped
breakbulk prior to containerization, 113 the Second Circuit considered the ordinary meaning of the word package and found that
stacks of ingots which were not tied or held together in any way
11 4
could not be considered a package.
Applying its new reasoning, the court went on to say that although the bundles were not the packages, it did not necessarily
follow that the container was the package, and in fact held that it
was not. 115 The court made it clear that in the absence of
extenuating circumstances, this case would be resolved by assessing liability at $500 per customary freight unit, which would be
the long ton. 11 6 Language was found in the bill of lading, however,
which would have increased the carrier's liability to $500 per ingot
as opposed to $500 per long ton. 1 17 Any increase in liability effected by agreement between the parties is expressly permitted
under § 4(5).118 The situation was further complicated by another
clause in the bill of lading which prohibited any increase in the
carrier's liability above that provided for in the act. 119 The court
decided that the ambiguity thus created in the bill of lading should
be resolved in favor of the shipper. 120 This should have meant that
Mitsui would receive $500 per ingot.' 2 1 Instead, the court ultimately relied on other language in the bill of lading in which the
shipper described the contents of the container as "bundles," even
112. Id.
113. Armstrong Cork Can., Ltd. v. S.S. Red Jacket, 74 Civ. 2770, slip. op. at 5
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 1979).
114. Nos. 80-7095/7085, slip op. at 1094.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1094-95.
117. The bill of lading provided that for those goods not shipped in packages,
liability would be assessed at $500 per shipping unit. The contract defined shipping
unit as "each physical unit or piece of cargo not shipped in a package, including articles or things of any description whatsoever ...." Id. at 1095-96. This would mean
that if the ingots were not shipped in packages, each individual ignot would be considered a shipping unit, thereby increasing the carrier's liability to $500 per ingot.
118. Id. at 1096. See also note 31 supra and accompanying text.
119. Nos. 80-7095/7085, slip op. at 1096.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1097. Of course, the shipper will never receive more than his actual
loss. 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5). Since Mitsui's actual loss was less than $500 multiplied by
1,834 ingots, they would have received the former amount. Nos. 80-7095/7085, slip
op. at 1097.
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though the ingots were not by definition properly bundled. 122
Since the carrier had no way of knowing that such representation
was false, liability was limited to $500 per bundle, thereby af123
firming the district court.
CONCLUSION
Judge Oakes, who had written the majority opinion in the
Kulmerland case, filed a separate concurring opinion in Mitsui.
Conceding the difficulty of the problem involved, he concluded:
[J]udge Friendly's most perceptive opinion in this case, coupled
with that of Judge Beeks in Matsushita . . .. referred to and
quoted at length by Judge Friendly, have persuaded me that the
"functional economics" test of Kulmerland does not function well
and had better be abandoned. In the realm of container shipping, where the bill of lading specifies the contents, the ship's
container should not be deemed a package-even presumptively
only-irrespective of how the goods within it are packed. I
therefore am joining in the abandonment of the KulmerlandCameco test, noting only that the results of neither case would
24
be changed by virtue of today's decision.'
The Mitsui decision does not answer all the questions raised
by the need to reinterpret COGSA's package limitation in light of
technological changes in the shipping industry. For example, it is
still not certain how a case such as Standard Electrica, where the
contents of a shipper-furnished container are not disclosed to the
carrier, might be decided today. It is certain, however, that a
standard such as the functional economics test is not useful in
passing upon these questions of liability. The more practical approach of Leather's Best and Mitsui should be employed in the interim until Congress decides to revise COGSA in accordance with
5
the 1968 Visby Amendments or the 1978 Hamburg Rules. 12
Lisa Filloramo

122.
123.
124.
125.

Nos. 80-7095/7085, slip op. at 1097.
Id.
Id. at 1103 (Oakes, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
See note 21 supra.

